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CIVIL RIGHTS-FEDERAL REMEDIES:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS MAY BE LIABLE FOR STUDENT-ON-STUDENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
I. FACTS
LaShonda Davis was a fifth-grade student at Hubbard Elementary
School during the 1992-93 school year.1 G.F., a male classmate, was
also in the fifth grade.2 In December of 1992, G.F. told LaShonda "I
want to feel your boobs" and "I want to get in bed with you." 3 These
comments were accompanied by G.F.'s attempt to touch LaShonda's
breasts and vaginal area. 4 During a physical education class in February
of 1993, G.F. inserted a doorstop in his pants and "behav[ed] in a
sexually suggestive and harassing manner" towards LaShonda. 5 G.F.
also rubbed against LaShonda "in a sexual manner" in April of 1993.6
G.F. was charged with and pled guilty to sexual battery in May of 1993.7
These incidents of sexual harassment and others like them-a total
of eight instances-spanned a six-month period. 8 Either LaShonda or
her mother reported all of these incidents to a teacher. 9 G.F. harassed
other girls who also reported this harassment to their teacher.10 Mrs.
Davis asked the school's principal, Mr. Querry, to discipline G.F. so that
her daughter could be protected. ll Mr. Querry responded by saying,
"[I] 'guess [I'll] have to threaten [him] a little bit harder."1 2 However,
nobody at Hubbard Elementary or the Monroe County School Board
ever disciplined G.F. for his behavior. 13 Over the course of the 1992-93
1. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). Hubbard Elementary
School is a public school located in Monroe County, Georgia. See id.
2. See Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Davis (No. 97-843).
3. Id. LaShonda and her mother reported this behavior to LaShonda's classroom teacher, Mrs.
Fort. See id. Mrs. Fort stated that she told the principal, Mr. Querry, about this incident. See id.
4. See id. Beginning with this incident and several times up to three months later, LaShonda
asked Mrs. Fort if she could change her seat in class so that she would not have to sit next to GF. See
id. These requests were denied. See id.
5. Id. LaShonda and her mother reported this behavior to the teachers in charge of the class,
Coach Whit Maples and Mrs. Joyce Pippen. See id. In March 1993, LaShonda and other girls, who
were subject to similar behavior by G.F., asked to meet with Principal Querry. See id. This request
was denied by Mrs. Fort. See id.
6. See id. LaShonda told Mrs. Fort about this behavior. See id.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1394 (1llth Cir. 1997).
9. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
10. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 635 (1999).
11. See Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Davis (No. 97-843).
12. Id.
13. See id.
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school year, Mrs. Davis noticed a change in LaShonda's behavior.14 Her
previously high grades dropped.15 In addition, LaShonda's father
discovered that she had written a suicide note. 16
Mrs. Davis brought suit against the Monroe County School Board
(Board) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, claiming on behalf of her daughter that the Board violated Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.17 The district court found
no basis for this claim, stating that the Board had in no way contributed
to the alleged harassment and that the Board was not responsible for the
acts of a student. 18 An appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision.1 9  The court of appeals
found that student-on-student sexual harassment constituted a cause of
action by analogizing this type of harassment to hostile environment
sexual harassment in the workplace, for which an employer may be
liable for acts of employee-on-employee sexual harassment. 20
The school moved for a rehearing en banc, which the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted. 2 1 The en banc court affirmed
the district court's decision. 22 The court reasoned that under the Spend-
ing Clause,23 an entity must have notice that it will be liable for acts of
third parties, and the school in this case lacked notice of its possible
liability for peer sexual harassment.24 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether a school district may be liable
for student-on-student sexual harassment. 25 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court held that a school may be liable for peer harassment when the
school is deliberately indifferent to the harassment. 26 The Court also
required that the harassment be "serious enough to have the systemic
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. LaShonda told Mrs. Davis that she "didn't know how much longer she could keep
[G.F.] off her." Id. at 4-5.
17. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)). Mrs. Davis also brought suit against the school district's
superintendent, Charles Dumas, and the principal, Mr. Querry. See id. at 364. These claims were
subsequently dismissed because of the doctrine of qualified immunity, which gives officials immunity
from actions where they exercise their discretion in an official capacity. See id. at 367.
18. See id.
19. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
20. See id. at 1194.
21. See generally Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418 (1 th Cir. 1996).
22. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (1 th Cir. 1997).
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States.").
24. See Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399-1400.
25. See generally Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 524 U.S. 980 (1998).
26. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999).
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effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or
activity."27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 2 8  The primary purpose of Title IX is to prevent
gender-based discrimination in schools by disallowing federal assistance
to educational institutions 29 that implement or are responsible for
practices favoring or hampering a student because of his or her
gender.30 Title IX was meant not only to prevent using federal money
for discriminatory practices, but also to protect individuals from
discriminatory practices. 31
The enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
was in the wake of civil rights legislation in 1964.32 In fact, the language
from Title IX was borrowed from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VI).33 The standards developed for an actionable Title IX
27. Id.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
29. Throughout this Comment, those liable under Title IX will be referred to as grant recipients,
educational institutions, or schools. A liable entity is defined as
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of
vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational
institution composed of more than one school, college, or department which are
administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college, or
department.
20 U.S.C. § 168 1(c) (1994).
30. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36 (1979) (citing 117 CoNG. REc.
39,252 (1971)). In Cannon, a woman was denied admission to two private medical schools. See id. at
680. She then brought a Title IX suit against the universities claiming that she was denied admission
because of her sex. See id. The district court in which she brought her case dismissed the action,
finding no private right of action for Title IX. See id. The appeals court affirmed. See id. The
United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the appeals court decision, finding that even though
Congress did not expressly provide for a private remedy, it was its intent to do so. See id. at 717.
31. See id. at 704.
32. See id at 694.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). Title VI states that "[nlo person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id. Senator Bayh noted the similarities between Title VI and Title IX. See 117 CONG.
REC. 30,408 (1971). He stated that in enacting Title IX, "[w]e are only adding the 3-letter word 'sex'
to existing law [Title VI]." Id.
Civil rights legislation was enacted primarily to redress discrimination against black persons in the
workplace and in education. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
202-03 (1979) (stating that although blacks had equal social rights, employment discrimination
hampered their ability to obtain a job, and therefore income, to enjoy equal social rights). While black
persons were the initial focus of the Civil Rights Act, the Act also came to stand for equality for all
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suit to remedy gender-based discrimination have aligned closely with
those standards developed for other sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
in two instances: (1) implying a private right of action 34 and (2)
determining elements of an actionable Title IX claim.35
A. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION ALLOWED FOR TITLE IX
Title IX does not expressly provide for a private right of action. 36
Courts have determined, however, that Title IX warrants a private right of
action by finding it is implied not only from the language of the
statute, 37 but also from the context in which the statute was adopted. 38
Legislative history shows that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which
does allow a private right of action. 39 Relying on Title VI, courts have
found that Title IX also 'implies a private right of action.40
The Supreme Court has stated that this private right of action is
available because the alternative remedy, withholding federal funds in
isolated instances of sexual harassment, may be too damaging to
educational institutions. 41 Alternative means to remedy discrimination
should be allowed when those means adequately discourage
discrimination, which is the purpose of the statute. 42 This private right
of action allows compensatory damages for a violation of Title IX.43
These damages are limited, however, to cases in which the grant recipient
races, sexes, religions, and national origins. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1995) (outlining the provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
34. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 710 (stating that Congress, in enacting Title IX, understood that the
remedies for Title IX should be the same as Title VI).
35. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (applying Title VII
elements to a Title IX issue). The Court in Franklin held that money damages were available to
successful Title IX claimants. See id. at 76. However, the case also has significance because the
Court borrowed the Title VII sexual harassment rule and applied it to a Title IX claim where a student
was bringing suit against her teacher for sexual harassment. See id. at 75. The Court applied the Title
VII rule because it found similarities between a supervisor-subordinate relationship in a workplace
setting and a teacher-student relationship in a school setting. See id.
36. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683. Prior to Cannon, the only remedy available to a successful Title IX
claimant was that federal financial aid to the educational institution was withheld. See id. at 695-96.
37. See id. at 694. The language of Title IX focuses on the class to be benefited from the statute.
See id. at 691. If the Title IX focus were instead on simply prohibiting the use of federal funds or on
preventing discrimination, a private right of action would not so easily be implied. See id. at 690-93.
38. See id. at 703.
39. See id. at 699.
40. See id. at 702-03.
41. See id. at 704-05.
42. See id. at 706-08.
43. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). The Court in Franklin
allowed compensatory damages for Title IX even though a private right of action does not
automatically presume compensatory damages as a remedy. See id. at 66. The Gwinnett County
Public Schools proposed that Ms. Franklin's damages be limited to backpay and prospective relief.
See id. at 75. The Court, however, found this proposal unworkable because the harassing teacher no
longer worked at the school, and Ms. Franklin no longer attended the school. See id at 76.
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was aware of, or had notice of, circumstances that could lead to liability
under Title IX. 4
4
B. ELEMENTS OF A TITLE IX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM
While the concept of a private cause of action was patterned after
Title VI, the elements of a Title IX sexual harassment claim were bor-
rowed from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).45 To
have a valid Title IX sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must satisfy
three elements: (1) the harassment must be the quid pro quo type or the
sexually hostile environment type, 46 (2) the educational institution must
have notice of the harassment, and (3) the educational institution must be
deliberately indifferent to the harassment. 47
If it is a sexually hostile environment case, then the harassment must
be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
[student's education] and create an abusive [educational]
environment." 48 Part of the standard for determining if a person has a
valid hostile environment claim is subjective, meaning the claimant must
believe that the environment is abusive. 49 At the same time, there is an
44. See id. at 74 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981))
(explaining that remedies are limited only when the violations are unintentional).
45. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75). Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995).
46. These two specific types of harassment have been identified within the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. These guidelines define sexual
harassment as
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature . . . when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999). The first type of harassment, quid pro quo sexual harassment,
recognizes harassment when sexual favors are granted in exchange for a favorable employment
position or benefit. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The second type of sexual harassment, hostile
environment sexual harassment, occurs when conditions in the workplace are "sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' Id. at 67.
47. See Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 1998). In
Morse, two students at the University of Colorado's Reserve Officer Training Corps alleged that they
had been harassed by a higher ranking cadet. See id. at 1126. They reported this behavior to their
supervising officer. See id. The supervising officer failed to stop the harassment and, in fact,
subjected them to further harassment. See id. The students then reported the harassment to the
administration at the university. See id. Claiming that the university did not adequately respond, the
students brought suit against the school under Title IX. See id.
48. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (modified so as to apply to the educational context).
49. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Court requires that the claimant
must subjectively believe that the environment is abusive; otherwise, the conditions of the claimant's
environment would not be altered and, therefore, there would be no violation of the statute. See id. at
2 1-22.
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objective standard that a claimant must show that a reasonable person
would find the environment hostile or offensive. 50 Also, the harasser
must have the intent to harass the victim because of his or her sex.51
Finally, the harassment must be more than one incident of name-calling
to be severe or pervasive enough to constitute a violation of Title VII.52
While courts have adopted Title VII principles as a basis for the first
element of an actionable Title IX sexual harassment claim, the United
States Supreme Court added the remaining two elements, notice and
deliberate indifference, for cases of teacher-student sexual harassment. 53
Adding the elements of notice and deliberate indifference was necessary
because of the differences between the two statutes. 54 Title IX was
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause,55 but Title VII was not.56
When legislation is enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, a
contractual relationship is formed between the federal government and
the state. 57 That is, in order for the state to receive those federal funds, it
must fulfill the conditions upon which the funds are granted.58 A state
should only be obligated to fulfill those conditions, however, when the
conditions are unambiguous, such that "[s]tates [can] exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation." 59 Thus, to have an actionable Title IX suit against a
school, a claimant must demonstrate that the school was on notice of its
50. See id. at 21. The Court found that this objective standard only means that a reasonable
person would believe that the harassing behavior caused a hostile or abusive working environment.
See id. at 22. Additionally, the Court held that no concrete injury or psychological harm was required
to have a valid claim. See id. at 23.
51. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a Title IX action
invalid because it was not based on sex when the action involved upper-class football players hazing a
fellow football player).
52. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing and quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), which found that "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet" could not be classified as
harassment under Title VII).
53. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998) (inferring that it is
only fair to withhold federal funds from a school district for a teacher's harassment when the school
district has notice of the discrimination and fails to remedy or attempt to remedy the harassment). See
generally Debra L. Hoffarth, Case Comment, United States Supreme Court Adopts "Actual Notice"
and "Deliberate Indifference" as the Standard for Title IX Damages for Teacher-Student Sexual
Harassment, 75 N.D. L. REV. 117 (1999) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gebser to hold school districts liable for teacher-student sexual harassment). In Gebser, a freshman
student had a sexual relationship with her teacher. See 524 U.S. at 278. The relationship had lasted
over a year. See id. The student, however, did not, at any time, report this relationship to the school.
See id. The teacher was eventually arrested. See id.
54. See id. at 286-87.
55. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992). The Spending Clause is
quoted in supra note 23.
56. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979) (stating that
Title VII was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
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possible liability for such an action. 60 This notice must be provided to
''an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective
action to end the discrimination."
6 1
Constructive notice is not enough, however. 62 Just because the
school should have known of the harassment does not make the school
liable. 63  In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District64 the
Court refused to apply agency principles 65 to impute liability under Title
IX.66 The Court found that when a teacher harassed a student and the
school was unaware of the harassment, the school could not be liable.
67
As a result, a school may not be liable for actions of its teachers merely
because the school employs the teacher. 68
Besides requiring that an educational institution have actual notice, a
claimant must also show that an educational institution was deliberately
indifferent to the harassment. 69 This means that the claimant must show
60. See id.
61. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). In Gebser, the Lago Vista
Independent School District had almost no notice of its teacher's sexual relationship with a student.
See id. at 278. The student had not notified school administrators of the relationship. See id. When
parents of two students complained that the teacher made inappropriate comments in class, the
principal arranged a meeting with the teacher, at which time the teacher agreed that he would make
no more offensive comments. See id. The Court found that based on these facts the Lago Vista
Independent School District lacked notice of the behavior. See id. at 292-93.
62. See id. at 290 (holding that absent "actual notice" one may not have an actionable sexual
harassment claim under Title IX).
63. See id.
64. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
65. An agent is "a person authorized by another to act on his [or her] account and under his [or
her] control." RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(3) cmt. e. For example, when an employee acts
on behalf of an employer or for that employer's benefit, the employee is said to be an "agent" of that
employer. See id. Under agency principles, the actions of the employee-agent are to be treated as
those of the employer; therefore, the employer is potentially liable for the actions of the employee
even if the employer was unaware of the actions. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807 (1998) (stating that an employer may be vicariously liable for acts of its supervisor employees).
66. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. The Court did not apply agency principles because of the
contractual nature of Title IX. See id. at 287-88. An educational institution forms a contract with the
federal government when the institution accepts federal funding in return for its agreement not to
discriminate. See id. at 286. Therefore, an educational institution must have the opportunity to remedy
any harassment to comply with federal requirements. See id. at 288. When a teacher acts independ-
ently, the educational institution is denied the chance to remedy the discrimination because it is
unaware of the discrimination. See id. at 287.
While agency principles do not apply to Title IX, under Title VII, an employer may be liable for
the misconduct of supervisors even though the employer may not know of the harassment. See
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). In Meritor, a bank employee was subjected
to repeated harassment by her supervisor. See id. at 60. The employee brought suit against her
employer under Title VII by alleging sexual harassment. See id. The bank stated that it did not know
of the harassment and therefore could not be held liable. See id. at 69. The Court found that an
employer is not absolutely liable for all instances of sexual harassment by supervisors. See id. at 73.
However, the Court stated that because the definition of employer in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) includes
agents of the employer, notice may not be required to have an actionable Title VII claim. See id. at 72
(stating that an employer will not always be protected if it lacks notice).
67. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93.
68. See id. at 289-93.
69. See id. at 292-93.
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that no action was taken by the educational institution to prevent further
harassment. 70 Once a claimant has established the three elements of a
sexual harassment claim, that she or he was subject sexual harassment
and that the educational institution knew of the harassment, but was
deliberately indifferent to the it, the claimant will have an actionable Title
IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim. 71 However, before the
decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,72 the Supreme
Court had only recognized the latter two elements in cases of
teacher-student sexual harassment. 73 Using the framework established
by teacher-student sexual harassment cases and hostile environment
sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court decided Davis.
III. ANALYSIS
In Davis, the Supreme Court decided whether a school district
might be liable for peer sexual harassment. 74 In a five-to-four decision
set forth in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor,75 the Court held that
peer sexual harassment in schools is privately actionable for monetary
damages, but only when the educational institution is deliberately
indifferent to known harassment. 76
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court clarified its opinion in Gebser by explaining the notice
requirement of a Title IX claim.77 The Court found that a peer sexual
harassment claim is allowed under Title IX and then went on to explain
how a peer sexual harassment analysis is the same as, and how it is
different from, a teacher-student sexual harassment analysis. 78
1. Notice Required for Title IX Claim
In determining whether educational institutions may be liable for
compensatory damages for peer sexual harassment under Title IX, the
Court first noted that a private right of action under Title IX is implied. 79
70. See Morse v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
deliberate indifference when no remedial action was taken after Reserve Officer Training Corps
members reported harassment to the university dean and to the university affirmative action officer).
71. See id.
72. 526 U.S. 629, 653-54.
73. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.
74. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653-54 (1999).
75. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. See id. at
632.
76. See id. at 653-54.
77. See id. at 645-49.
78. See id. at 649-53.
79. See id. at 639 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (holding that
[VOL. 76:977984
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Private money damages, however, are not available when the educational
institution does not have notice of its potential liability. 80
The Board claimed that it lacked the requisite notice of potential
liability for peer sexual harassment because neither the language nor the
legislative history of Title IX indicated the possibility of this type of
liability. 8' The Board maintained that under Title IX an educational
institution is only liable for its own misconduct. 82 The Board asserted
that the questionable conduct in this case was harassment by G.F.83 and,
further, that G.F.'s conduct could not be imputed to the Board under
agency principles. 84 The Board argued, therefore, that G.F.'s conduct
was not actionable under Title JX.85
The Court agreed with the Board that one may be liable for Title IX
discrimination only for one's own misconduct. 86 However, the Court
found that the actionable misconduct in this case was not G.F.'s actions,
but rather the Board's inaction; 87 the Board caused the discrimination by
not preventing it from happening. 88 The Court in Gebser held that a
school district may be liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a
student provided that the school had actual notice of the harassment and
was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.8 9 Under the reasoning of
while Congress did not expressly state a private right of action in the language of Title IX, Congress
did intend that those benefited by the statute would have such a right)).
80. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (explaining that a
state must knowingly accept conditions placed on the receipt of federal money granted under
Congress' spending power).
81. See Brief for Respondents at 5-6, Davis (No. 97-843).
82. See id. Those "receiving Federal financial assistance" will be liable under Title IX. 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Appellant stated that students are not included in the definition of recipient.
See Brief for Respondents at 11, Davis (No. 97-843) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1998)). A grant
recipient is defined as
any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State or political
subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other
entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or
through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which
receives or benefits from such assistance including any subunit, successor, assignee or
transferee thereof.
34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h).
83. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999).
84. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998) (rejecting the
application of agency principles to Title IX). The Court stated that Congress did not intend for an
educational institution to be vicariously liable. See id. at 1998. The effect of holding a school
vicariously liable would be to withhold Title IX funds where the school was unaware of the incident
and therefore unable to remedy that situation to comply with Title IX. See id. at 290.
85. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
86. See id. at 640-41 (stating that "the recipient itself must 'exclud[e] [persons] from partici-
pation in .... den[y] [persons] the benefits of, or . .. subjec[t] [persons] to discrimination under' its
'program[s] or activit[ies]"') (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)).
87. See id. at 649.
88. See id. at 644-45.
89. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:977
Gebser, the mere fact that the alleged harassment was committed by
someone other than the state does not preclude liability under Title IX.90
The Board argued that it had little control over the conduct of the
student and therefore could not prevent G.F.'s misconduct.9 1 Further,
the Board stated that to be held liable for harassment, an educational
institution needs to have control over the discriminatory action because
otherwise the educational institution would be unable to remedy the
action. 92 The Court noted, however, that schools have traditionally
maintained control over the context in which the harassment occurs and
over the harasser. 93 This control is dictated by the role of the teacher as
a custodian of the students while the students are in the school. 94 Thus,
the Court rejected the Board's argument that it did not have authority
over the students. 95
When an educational institution acts with deliberate indifference to
known harassment and the institution has the authority to prevent the
discrimination, the Court concluded that the institution will be subject to
liability for that discrimination. 96 The Court based its reasoning on the
fact that school districts have ample notice that they could be subject to
such liability. 97 This notice comes from several sources, including the
language of Title IX itself,98 the regulatory scheme surrounding Title
IX,99 and common law.100
90. See id. at 292.
91. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (citing Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d. 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1996)).
92. See id. at 644.
93. See id. at 646.
94. See id. (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). In Vernonia, the
Court held that subjecting participants in school athletics to random testing of urine for drugs did not
constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. See 515 U.S. at 666. The Court
reached this ruling in part because school administrators and teachers act as parents while the children
are in school. See id. at 654. This pseudo-parent function allows teachers and school administrators to
implement "parental authority" over school children. See id. at 655. Courts have noted, for example,
that "it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse." Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (rejecting a
claim by a fourteen-year-old student who maintained that his freedom of speech right was violated
when his school suspended him for using lewd language in a school assembly).
95. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.
96. See id. at 646-47.
97. See id. at 644.
98. See id. The Court stated that the use of the word "subjects" in Title IX equates to the word
"undergo." See id. at 644-45. Therefore, when an educational institution knows of discrimination, but
is deliberately indifferent to the discrimination, then the educational institution is effectively causing
the student to undergo or be subjected to such discrimination. See id. at 645.
99. See id. at 643-44 (stating that some regulations promulgated by the Department of Education
may make a grant recipient liable for the actions of third parties) (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31(b)(6),
106.31(d), 106.37(a)(2), 106.38(a), 106.51(a)(3) (1998)).
100. See id. at 644 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320, cmt. a (1965)).
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The Court stated that even though a school may be liable for sexual
harassment, it may still retain flexibility in its administration. 10 1 To
prevent liability, a school must simply respond to the discrimination in a
manner that is not "clearly unreasonable." 102
2. Peer Sexual Harassment Allowed as Title IX Claim
After the Court determined that a student might validly pursue a
claim under Title IX for peer sexual harassment, the Court addressed
whether the harassment in this case rose to the level of actionable dis-
crimination under Title IX.103 To have a valid claim for discrimination
under Title IX, the claimant must satisfy two conditions.104 First, the
actionable party must be a recipient of federal funding. 105 Second, the
claimant must show that the actionable party subjected him or her to
discrimination.106 The Board did not dispute this first condition
because it did receive federal funding.107
The Board contested the second condition and asserted that
student-on-student sexual harassment is not a type of discrimination
proscribed by Title IX.108 The Court found that peer sexual harassment
can rise to the level of actionable discrimination by showing that the
harassment satisfied the conditions of a sexual hostile environment
claim. 109 In other words, the harassment must be so "sufficiently severe
or pervasive [as] to alter the conditions of the [student's education] and
create an abusive [educational] environment."110 Whether the harass-
ment satisfies these conditions depends on the totality of the
circumstances.Ill The Court cautioned that one factor or circumstance
that a court must bear in mind is that children are just beginning to learn
101. See id. at 648.
102. See id. at 648-49.
103. See id. at 650.
104. See 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (1994).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999).
108. See id. at 640.
109. See id. at 644.
110. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (modified so as to apply to the
educational context).
111. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
82 (1998)). In Oncale, the Court held that a same sex sexual harassment claim is valid under Title
VII. See 523 U.S. at 82. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that the analysis for these
claims is no different than the analysis for any other claim. See id. at 79. The test to determine a valid
sexual harassment claim is whether "a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position" would find the
actions severely hostile or abusive when considering "all the circumstances." Id. at 81 (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
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how to interact with others, so their actions may not be held to as high of
a standard as an adult in the workplace.112
The Court noted that specific circumstances to consider in instances
of student-on-student sexual harassment include the age of the harasser,
the severity of the actions, and the time period over which the harassment
took place."l 3 Additionally, a claim for peer sexual harassment will be
harder to satisfy than teacher-student sexual harassment because harass-
ment in a teacher-student relationship would more likely affect the
ability of the student to receive an adequate education. 114 Overall, the
behavior must have a "systemic effect of denying the victim educational
access to an educational program or activity.""l
5
Applying the hostile environment claim to this case, the Court noted
that LaShonda may have a valid Title IX claim."16 G.F.'s misconduct
spanned over five months, included physical touching as well as sexual
verbal comments, affected multiple victims, and affected LaShonda's
mental condition and her grades."l 7 Additionally, LaShonda asked for
help from several teachers, as well as her principal, but these requests
were denied. 118 The Court found that these circumstances amounted to
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference."l 9 As a result, the Court
reversed and remanded the Eleventh Circuit's decision and held that a
peer sexual harassment claim is actionable under Title IX.120
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Court's opinion in four ways.
121
First, he stated that a school has no notice of a private action for peer
sexual harassment. 122 Second, he explained that peer sexual harassment
should not be considered discrimination under Title IX.123 Third, he
noted that the Court's decision was not narrowly tailored so as to limit
"run-away litigation."124 Finally, he argued that this decision "oblit-
112. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
113. See id. at 651-52.




118. See id. at 634.
119. See id. at 636.
120. See id. at 654.
121. Justice Kennedy was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Scalia. See id.
122. See id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 672.
124. See id. at 677.
[VOL. 76:977988
CASE COMMENT
erate[s the] distinctions between national and local spheres of
interest." 125
Justice Kennedy began his dissent by stating that a school did not
have adequate notice to remedy peer discrimination because the plain
language of Title IX did not give this notice. 126 He stated that Title IX
imposes liability when a school district "subjects" students to
harassment. 127 However, Justice Kennedy defined "subjects" as harass-
ment "authorized" by the school, not merely as harassment occurring
in a "context subject to the school's control."128 In the instance of peer
sexual harassment, there is no affirmative action by the grant
recipient. 129
Justice Kennedy also argued that the Board did not have notice
because the Court had previously rejected the application of agency
principles to Title IX claims.130 Even if a grant recipient knows of the
harassment, it does not have control over students in the way that it has
control over teachers to remedy the discrimination.131 Justice Kennedy
rejected the Court's argument that schools had notice of their potential
liability through the Department of Education's Title IX guidelines or
state tort law. 132
Second, Justice Kennedy asserted that student harassment usually is
not discrimination under Title IX because students' inappropriate
behavior is often just the result of learning how to interact with
people.133 Justice Kennedy wrote that the Court's ruling incorrectly
applied an adult standard to children.1 34 He argued that to apply Title
VII work place standards to Title IX school standards is untenable,
because "schools are not workplaces and children are not adults."135
Third, Justice Kennedy asserted that the majority's decision did not
delineate which actions would or would not be viable under Title IX. 136
He contended that children are invariably teased in school and therefore,
125. Id. at 654.
126. See id. at 658.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 658-60. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, defined "subjects" as "causing to
undergo" and stated that students are subjected to harassment when the school's deliberate
indifference causes students to undergo harassment. See id. at 648.
129. See id. at 660.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 664.
132. See id. at 669. Justice Kennedy stated that most of the Department of Education Regulations
cited by the Court only state that schools shall not give aid to third parties who discriminate. See id.
He wrote that schools were not aware that students were these third parties. See id.
133. See id. at 672. Children lack the maturity to be fully accountable for their actions, stated
Justice Kennedy. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 675.
136. See id. at 678.
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at some point are denied equal access to education.1 37 Additionally, he
noted that it would be difficult to draw the line between name-calling
and actionable sexual harassment. 138 This decision will allow parents to
bring suit against a school for simple name-calling.139
Fourth, Justice Kennedy asserted that even if a court could accurate-
ly determine which conduct constitutes sexual harassment and which
does not, the educational institutions themselves and not a court should
remedy the situation. 140 "This case is about federalism," he wrote. 14 1
Justice Kennedy noted that school administration has typically been left
up to school administrators and parents, and it should not be subject to
intrusion by courts in the federal system.142 He cautioned that this
decision opens the door to federal decisions dictating school policy.' 4 3
In a final poke at the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote, "After
today, Johnny will find that the routine problems of adolescence are to
be resolved by invoking a federal right to demand assignment to a desk
two rows away."144
IV. IMPACT
Initial reactions to the Davis decision are mixed: insurers are against
the decision;145 the National Organization for Women considers the
outcome a victory, but wants an easier standard than "deliberate
indifference;"1 46 and the National School Board Association supports
the decision.' 4 7 An attorney before the Pennsylvania School Boards
Association explained the decision in terms of good news and bad
137. See id. Justice Kennedy contended that children react to teasing in a way that would deny
them equal access to education. See id. That is, a child may skip class for being called "four-eyes."
See id. The Court countered this argument by stating that this comparison was "inapposite and
misleading" because the action by the student must be persistent and severe to have an actionable
claim. See id. at 652.
138. See id. at 676-77.
139. See id. at 677. Justice Kennedy stated that the majority's position will open a flood of
liability. See id. at 680. These decisions, he said, will amount to a huge expenditure by schools in
defending these types of lawsuits. See id.
140. See id. at 684.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 686.
144. Id. Justice O'Connor responded to this comment, stating that the decision "assures that little
Mary may attend class." Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment in Class is Ruled Schools' Liability, N.Y.
TIMES ABSTRAcTs, May 25, 1999, at sec. A.
145. See Steven Brostoff, High Court Harassment Ruling Could Hike Costs, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER PROPERTY & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MANAGEMENT, May 31, 1999 (defining the
significance of the Davis decision for school litigation and liability cost).
146. See generally Thalia Myrianthopoulos, Supreme Court Restricts Civil Rights Remedies,
NATIONAL NOW TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999 (discussing 1999 Supreme Court decisions important to the
National Organization for Women).
147. See Greenhouse, supra note 144 (reporting that a spokesperson for the National School
Boards Association indicated that schools were already meeting the high standard set by Davis).
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news. 148 The good news is that the "deliberate indifference" standard is
high and should limit the number of plaintiffs,149 but the bad news is that
courts may not throw out frivolous lawsuits.1
50
Courts following the decision in Davis need to define the bound-
aries of conduct included in an actionable Title IX claim to avoid these
"frivolous" claims. 151 For instance, courts will have to determine when
conduct is simple name-calling and, therefore, not actionable under Title
IX, and when an action is "serious enough to have the systemic effect of
denying . . . equal access to an educational program or activity."1
52
Drawing a line between these two actions can be confusing and difficult
in light of the varying attitudes towards sexual harassment.
153
For guidance in determining when peer sexual harassment is
"serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying . . . equal access
to an educational program or activity,"1 54 courts may look to cases
involving teacher-student sexual harassment. However, the bar for
actionable peer sexual harassment is necessarily set higher than for
actionable teacher-student sexual harassment.
155
Courts may also look to hostile environment sexual harassment
cases under Title VII to define more clearly when a particular type of
behavior is actionable, because the test for determining peer sexual
harassment was borrowed from hostile environment sexual harassment
cases. 156 Arguably, actionable behavior for peer sexual harassment may
have a somewhat lower standard than "workplace hostile environment
sexual harassment" because of the greater adverse effect that peer sexual
harassment has on students. 157
To be actionable under Title IX, peer sexual harassment must have a
"systemic effect" on a student's education.158 This suggests that the
148. See Paula Wolf, Harassment-Suit Trends in Schools: Good, Bad News, LANCASTER NEW




152. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999).
153. See Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression:
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205
(1999) (comparing the response of a principal who suspended a six-year-old child for kissing a fellow
student and the response of school officials who did nothing after receiving a report of the "Spur
Posse," a group of largely male athletes who had sex with girls for points).
154. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.
155. See id. at 653. The relationship between a teacher and a student is such that actionable
behavior under Title IX would be less severe than actionable behavior for peer sexual harassment.
See id.
156. See id. at 651 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (setting the
standard for actionable Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment claims)).
157. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
158. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999).
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harassment must be pervasive and widespread.159 While not clearly
defined, an example of this "systemic effect" can be found in a recent
Tenth Circuit decision. 160 This decision found a valid Title IX claiml6'
where a developmentally handicapped girl was subjected to harassing
behavior for over a month.162 This girl was enrolled in special education
classes with a boy who had known behavioral and disciplinary
problems.163 This boy sexually assaulted the girl several times.164 Her
teachers knew of these instances, but did not inform the girl's mother.165
The girl entered a psychiatric hospital because of suicidal behavior.166
When the girl returned to school, she was assaulted again.167
While the Court in Davis recognized that it was possible that single
instances of harassment could have a systemic effect on a student's
education,168 isolated incidents of harassment generally have been held
not pervasive enough to be actionable under Title IX.169 In Adusumilli
v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 170 a female student complained of
multiple instances of sexual misconduct by teachers and students. 17 1
However, only two of these instances were reported: one involved a
student touching her right shoulder, and the other involved another
student touching her breast. 172 These single instances of harassment, the
Court held, are not the type of severe and pervasive harassment that Title
IX was meant to proscribe.173 Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals has
held that where a student's leg was touched repeatedly by another
student on a single day, the incident was not pervasive enough to amount
to "systemic" harassment.174
Besides defining actionable behavior under Title IX for peer sexual
harassment, courts will also need to define more clearly what constitutes
a response by school officials as "clearly unreasonable in light of the
159. See id. (defining the standard which indicates liability in cases of peer sexual harassment).
160. See generally Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
161. See id. at 1249.




166. See id. at 1244.
167. See id.
168. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652-53 (1999) (stating that a single
instance of harassment might be actionable if it is sufficiently severe, but Congress probably did not
intend a single instance of harassment to be actionable).
169. See Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 98-3561, 1999 WL 528169, at *1 (7th Cir. Jul.
21, 1999).
170. No. 98-3561, 1999 WL 528169 (7th Cir. Jul. 21, 1999).
171. Adusumilli, 1999 WL 528169, at *1.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Mosley v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 997 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
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known circumstances" so as to amount to "deliberate indifference."1 75
After Davis, the definition of "clearly unreasonable" was refined in
Wills v. Brown University, 176 which noted that the educational institution
must take "timely and reasonable" steps to prevent further harassment
of the person being harassed.1 77 In Wills, a professor harassed a
student.178 She notified the university which then reprimanded the
professor. 179 The court did not allow evidence of students' later com-
plaints of similar misbehavior by the professor because these incidents
occurred after the reprimand and did not involve the plaintiff. 80
The adequacy of the response depends on the credibility and
seriousness of the complaint.181 One court stated that a jury could find
an inadequate response when several teachers, students, and members of
the community reported to the principal incidents of inappropriate
behavior by a female teacher towards her male students. 182 The princi-
pal did not respond adequately because he failed to investigate the
incidents or confront the teacher with allegations of sexual relations.1 83
An initial adequate response may still create liability if the school
administration is aware that the initial response was inadequate and fails
to do anything more to remedy the harassment.1 84
Courts also need to determine what constitutes "actual notice" 185
and what does not. After Davis was decided, one court ruled that a
report of serious sexual misconduct need not come from the person who
witnessed the harassment. 186 However, it is not clear what type of "actu-
al notice" is needed in instances of less serious conduct. 187 It is also not
clear what position the official who receives the notice should have. 188 A
subsequent court decision refused to name a rank at which notice was
sufficient, stating, "Different school districts may assign different duties
to [varying] positions or even reject the traditional hierarchical structure
175. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999).
176. 184 F.3d 20 (lst Cir. 1999).
177. Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20,26 (1st Cir. 1999).
178. See id. at 23.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 26.
181. See Doe v. School Admin. Dist., 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D. Me. 1999).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Wills, 184 F.3d at 26.
185. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1998) (stating that an
educational institution must have actual notice of the harassing behavior in order to be held liable for
an actionable Title IX sexual harassment claim).
186. See Doe, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64.
187. See id. (stating that the actual notice standard is relatively new and therefore not well-
defined).
188. See Murrell v. Denver Sch. Dist., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (8th Cir. 1999).
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altogether."] 89 At a minimum, the official must have control over the
situation. 190
Some commentators question whether "actual notice" is even
appropriate to achieve the objectives of Title IX when very young
students are subjected to harassment.191 Children may be unwilling or
unable to report harassment because of the apparent authority that the
harassing student has over the child. Additionally, young children may
be unable to express or identify harassment because of their
immaturity. 192
V. CONCLUSION
By more clearly defining the boundaries of an actionable peer
sexual harassment claim under Title IX, courts can "contain the flood of
liability"193 against educational institutions. At the same time, courts
can help achieve the purpose of Title IX by preventing sexual harass-
ment, which "chills the learning environment and subverts the very
purpose of the educational institution."194
Sara K. Sorenson
189. Id. (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizano Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 660 (5th Cir. 1997)).
190. See id.
191. See Kindred, supra note 153, at 220.
192. See Kindred, supra note 153, at 220.
193. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 680 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Kindred, supra note 153, at 239.
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